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   1 
SECURITY, BORDERS, AND THE EASTERN  
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
  
 
In 2003 the European Union adopted its first security strategy, which identified the key threats 
and challenges to European security, its strategic objectives, as well as the possible means for 
addressing these objectives.  The document, presented by CFSP
1 High Representative Javier 
Solana, was an important milestone in the development of the EU as a regional security actor 
with potential to play a global security role.  The strategy, entitled “A Safer Europe in a Better 
World,” also signified that the security of Europe was indivisible from that of the rest of the 
world, and especially its immediate neighborhood. 
 
  As European integration deepens, there is a growing perception that the member states 
cannot adequately protect their societies as a result of their borderless frontiers, resulting in an 
increasing internal insecurity.  The current round of enlargement is also implicated in this 
process, as it poses a number of challenges in this area.  This enlargement brings the European 
Union’s eastern border deep into the territory of the former Soviet Union in the Baltic region, 
and reaches states that are still in the process of institution-building The management of these 
new borders will have a significant impact on the stability of the rest of Europe, which finds 
itself outside the EU, as well as on the internal security of those who are inside.  This essay aims 
to look at some of the discursive links between security and the eastern enlargement of the 
European Union and the role of security in creating the two “Europes,” as witnessed by the 
renewed emphasis on the new eastern external border of the EU.  It argues that it is primarily 
societal security threats that have been important in the context of enlargement, contributing to 
the implementation of internal security policies, whose effects are sometimes conflicting with the 
overall objective of peaceful, stable and prosperous Europe.   
 
  The article begins by looking at the linkage between the lifting of internal borders and 
non-traditional military threats, such as immigration and organized crime.  It then examines how 
the eastern enlargement has been implicated in the securitization of these cross-border activities 
and the policy responses to the perceived security deficit.  It concludes by discussing some of the 
consequences of the strengthening of the external borders of the EU on its new members as well 
as on its new neighbors to the east.  
 
 
 
Internal Security and Freedom of Movement in the European Union   
 
The European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 lists terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures, and organized crime as the key 
global challenges and threats to European security.
2  The latest Eurobarometer, on the other 
                                                           
1 Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
2 A Secure Europe in a Better World.  European Security Strategy.  (Brussels, 12 December 2003)  
http://europa.eu.int   2 
hand, shows that ninety percent of the general public consider fighting unemployment as the 
EU’s top priority, closely followed by maintaining peace and security on the continent and 
fighting terrorism (89%), fighting poverty and social exclusion, organized crime and drug 
trafficking (88%), and fighting illegal immigration close behind (83%).
3  Hence, there appears to 
be a convergence of perception among decision-makers and the public alike regarding terrorism 
and organized crime as key threats.  Maintaining peace and stability, fighting unemployment, 
illegal immigration and drug-trafficking also top the list of security concerns for ordinary 
Europeans as well as their top decision-makers.  While peace and stability and the containment 
of regional conflicts are clearly among the more traditional security concerns, the “softer” 
security issues came to top the agenda in the 1990s, and especially since the September 11
th 
attacks on New York and Washington.      
 
  As the European Security Strategy acknowledges, “the post Cold War environment is one 
of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are 
indissolubly linked.”
4 The completion of the common market and the gradual disappearance of 
borders among the member states of the European Union were accompanied by the continuous 
strengthening and increasing importance of their external borders.  Processes of globalization in 
general, and more concrete events, such as the opening of the former Eastern bloc, among others, 
contributed to the increasing profile of borders on the European Continent.  Border-controls are 
intended to preserve the European Union from a wave of unwanted immigrants and refugees, 
terrorism, drug- and human-trafficking, and other types of organized crime.   
 
The removal of internal borders within the EU created a discourse on the “security 
deficit,” which in turn, led to a renewed emphasis on the policing of the external borders of the 
Union and placed immigration firmly into the security frameworks of the member states, and 
subsequently EU-wide.  Portrayed as a root cause of perceived threats to economic well being, 
social and political order, and cultural and religious identities (especially in the context of 
immigration from North Africa and the Middle East), in the 1990s migration was securitized as 
an existential threat to society, thereby justifying the need to take extraordinary measures to 
protect it.
5 According to the security framework developed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 
“securitization” refers to a process where “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring 
emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”
6  
Security, then, is a subjective dynamic, where an issue becomes a matter of security when it is 
presented as such; in other words, security is a “speech act.”
7  
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5 The concept of “securitization” was developed in Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde,  Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis.  (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) 24-27; and Ole Wæver, 
“Securitization and Desecuritization,” On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia Press 
University, 1995) 54-55. 
 
6 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 23-4. 
 
7 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 24-27; Wæver, “Securitization and 
Desecuritization” 54-55.   3 
Some of the earliest examples of the securitization of migration in Europe can be found 
throughout the text of the Schengen Agreement.  For example, Title 1, Art. 7, provides for the 
approximation of the signatories’ visa policies as soon as possible “in order to avoid the adverse 
consequences in the field of immigration and security that may result from easing checks at the 
common borders,” and the application of visa and admission procedures “taking into account the 
need to ensure the protection of the entire territory of the five States against illegal immigration 
and activities that could jeopardize security.”
8  The 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen 
Agreement also connects migration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime, and border 
control, and locates it in a framework regulating the security of the internal market.
9  Most 
recently Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU for CFSP, stated in a speech to the 
European Parliament that “massive flow of drugs and migrants are coming to Europe and affect 
its security.  These threats are significant by themselves, but it is their combination that 
constitutes a radical challenge to our security.”
10 These statements clearly imply the necessity of 
measures directed at cross-border movements of migrants and drugs, with the goal of keeping 
Europe safe.  Significantly, they also group immigration and criminal activity, such as drug 
trafficking, on the same scale as security concerns requiring immediate attention.  The linkages 
created between immigration, organized crime, and even terrorism contributed to what Didier 
Bigo calls an “internal security field” in Western Europe, which places illegal immigration, 
crime and terrorism on a single security continuum.
11  Most often this process takes place within 
the political discourse, where the securitization of an issue enables actors to propose means for 
finding a solution for the security problem and claim competence to deal with it. 
  
Terrorism
12 has become the main politically related violent threat to the societies of the 
European Union.  In response to the attacks in the United States and especially after the Madrid 
bombings, the EU accelerated the implementation of existing measures and introduced new ones 
for combating terrorism, including the adoption of common definition of terrorism, and an EU-
wide arrest warrant, among others.  While Europeans were not unaccustomed to battling 
terrorism, prior to September 11 the efforts were focused primarily on terrorist groups who were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
8 “Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
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9“Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985.”  Official Journal of the European 
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10 Summary of the Address by Mr. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
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Pinter, 1994) 165. 
 
12 David Carlton defines terrorism as “significant levels of violence perpetrated by politically-motivated sub-state 
actors who may or may not be to some degree sponsored by, but who will not normally be directly controlled by, 
sovereign states.”  in Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe.  eds. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, 
Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre. (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1993): 167 -181 
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active on a national level, and whose demands were concrete and negotiable.  In contrast, the 
emphasis has now shifted to international terrorism, with its global financial networks, 
communications and operations.
13 Terrorism is also a threat that is rooted within Western 
societies, thereby making possible the connection between open borders and immigration – from 
the Middle East in particular - with facilitating terrorism.
14  As Ole Wæver argues, at least in 
part, this fear is again rooted in the ethnonational fear of foreigners and justifies support for 
repressive internal security practices.
15 Framing the issue of terrorism in this way often implies 
that it is immigrants who are at the root of these problems, and tighter policing seems to be the 
proposed solution. 
The existing discourses on migration in Europe have been grouped along four different 
dimensions: the economic discourse of threat, which focuses on job losses and the financial 
burden of immigration; discourses of solidarity, which focus on democratic values and human 
rights; discourse of security, with emphasizes criminality and social security; and the discourse 
of positive diversity, which includes multiculturalism, and brain drain from the “push” regions, 
among others.
16 For example, Jef Huysmans argues that in the EU the securitization of migration 
has occurred mainly along the dimensions of identity, public order, and welfare systems, which 
fall under the categories of economic threats and security discourses.   This view appears to 
agree with Wæver’s argument that immigration threatens the collective identity of a society, and 
by association, its welfare provisions.  Huysmans argues that as immigrants are not part of “us,” 
therefore, they should not benefit from the welfare state, which rightfully belongs only to 
nationals.  In other words, the notions of social solidarity and distribution of welfare become 
intertwined with notions of nationality and citizenship.  Since immigrants and refugees are not 
citizens of a member state, they are not seen as members of that community, and therefore, 
should not fully share the benefits of the internal market, such as free movement, and welfare 
provisions.  This linkage between nationality and welfare entitlements is what Huysmans refers 
to as “welfare chauvinism.”
17  
  
The next sections will look at how the eastern enlargement of the European Union is 
implicated in the internal security concerns of the European Union.  It argues that the widespread 
perception of a wave of economic immigrants from the new members has led to fears about the 
labor markets and welfare of the “old” members, and resulted in restrictions on the free 
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16 Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk, Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European 
States, in Agnieszka Weinar, Securitization and Humanitarianism – Polish Migration Policy and the Communities of 
Meaning.   Paper presented at the CGES Conference, February 20-21, 2004, Washington, DC 
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movement of labor.  Moreover, the eastern border of the enlarged EU reaches states, which the 
Union sees as exporters of illegal immigration, drug- and human-trafficking, and organized 
crime.  Hence, as the new external border of the EU is becoming increasingly more scrutinized, 
it contributes to the disruption of long-standing economic and social relationships in the border 
regions, and ultimately a new dividing line between the “ins” and “outs” of the integration 
process. 
 
Enlargement and Security in the European Union 
  
The present round of enlargement is undoubtedly a project without a precedent in the brief 
history of European integration in terms of its scope and transformational effect.  It adds to the 
complexity of the EU, changes its profile, reaches new neighbors, and establishes a more 
complex power in the world.  It also divides Europe in two, with the “other” Europe being either 
anxious to get in, or feeling excluded.  Since the new enlargement is only an intermittent step 
toward the final reaches of the European Union, its future, and perhaps final, borders are still a 
matter of speculation.  As the dividing line between those who are on the “inside” and those on 
the “outside,” the eastern border is also a contributor to the identity definition of those on both 
sides of the border.  In the meantime, the new eastern border is perceived as the source of some 
of the main security threats to the EU, since the new 
18members are countries of transit for illegal 
immigrants and drug- and human-traffickers from further east.  As a result, this external border 
of the EU has been further strengthened and even militarized.   
 
  The expansion to the east was a form of foreign policy that was intimately tied to 
maintaining peace and stability on the continent.  From its inception the eastern enlargement was 
legitimized as a tool for achieving lasting peace and security, as well as conditioned by the 
ability of the candidate states to maintain such relations.  Following the collapse of communist 
regimes in the Central and Eastern European countries, the potential for ethnic conflicts, 
economic disruptions, political instability and their spillover effects on the then European 
Community led Western European leaders to emphasize the need for promoting good neighborly 
relations among these countries, helping stabilize their economies, and improve minority rights, 
among others.  According to the Commission ”enlargement – both for the EU, the candidate 
states and their neighbors -- is rightly viewed as being part of an overall security endeavor on the 
European continent as is enlargement of NATO.”
19  Even though security concerns are hardly 
mentioned in the admission criteria, those have played a prominent role in the enlargement 
process. For example, at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, when the decision to 
enlarge was announced, the European Commission stated that the prospect of membership would 
“provide an element of stability against a background of continuing turbulence in the former 
Soviet Union and the tragedy unfolding in the former Yugoslavia and diminish tension in a 
region where confidence and stability are suffering from the absence of a viable security 
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architecture.”
20Hence, the possibility of accession in the European Union, albeit at a distant 
future date, was seen as an incentive for the associated countries to continue to transform their 
political as well as economic systems, and as an instrument for maintaining stability in the 
eastern part of the continent.  Thus, enlargement was presented as the mechanism intended to 
deal with the problems of peace and stability. “Desecuritization,” according to Buzan et al, refers 
to a process in which issues are shifted out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining 
processes of the political sphere.
21  For example, integration is often presented as the solution to 
the fragmentation and violence of Europe’s past, i.e., integration is the desecuritized effect of the 
securitized threat.  Enlargement, as a continuation and geographical expansion of integration, 
suggests expanding this project of ensuring peace and security to the eastern part of the 
continent, thereby being desecuritized.  More specific security concerns regarding good 
neighborly relations and minority rights became de facto accession preconditions with the Pact 
on Stability in Europe, which was signed in 1995.  The Pact, which was a joint action under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, promised a framework for “lasting good-
neighborliness” in Central and Eastern Europe.  This policy instrument was another step, which 
linked enlargement to security.   
 
  While potential territorial disputes or ethnic problems may have constituted a cause for 
concern, it was primarily non-traditional security concerns emanating from Central and Eastern 
Europe that caused growing anxiety in the EU.  Among those, migration, organized crime, drug-
trafficking and human smuggling gradually came to the forefront of the debate.  Enlargement 
was seen both as the solution to some of these problems and as the source, due to the 
permeability of the candidate countries’ borders.  As Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that, 
“Without enlargement western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict 
and mass migration on its borders.”
22  In this particular case, Mr. Blair presents enlargement as 
the solution to the threats of instability, conflict and migration, thereby making the link between 
enlargement and internal security, and obtaining a desecuritizing effect.  
 
In line with this reasoning, the eastern enlargement was arguably the most important 
factor behind the development of justice and home affairs in the EU since the creation of the 
third pillar.  Enlargement itself can be seen as a policy intended to enhance internal security.  
For example, Lykke Friis argued that by enlarging the EU would move its borders to the east, 
effectively creating a cordon sanitaire between the member states and the near abroad, where the 
problems governments faced were even more severe, while simultaneously forcing the CEECs to 
reduce the permeability of their borders and strengthen their judicial systems.  The adoption and 
implementation of the JHA acquis was seen as critical, since otherwise the EU would in fact be 
internalizing the very same problem against which it was trying to protect itself, facilitated by the 
visa-free regime and the free movement of labor after accession.  By insisting that the candidates 
adopted the JHA acquis, the EU could minimize the import of security problems once the 
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CEECs became members.  In the meantime, growing stability in the region and resumed 
economic growth would reduce the number of immigrants.
23  
 
Giving due consideration to the political, economic, and social upheavals that took place 
in the post-communist countries in the process of transformation, and recognizing the 
considerable prosperity gap that still exist between the two parts of Europe, it is easy to 
understand the expectations of mass emigration from the region.   Enlargement would also make 
the Union more vulnerable to illegal migrants, drug-smuggling and money laundering, since the 
new members with become transit countries for illegal immigrants from further east, the Middle 
East, or Central Asia. 
24  Although the expectations of large-scale immigration from the CEECs 
never materialized,
25 nonetheless cross-border movements became securitized in the political 
discourses in Western Europe, thereby contributing to the rise of right-wing political parties
26 
and organizations.  Securing the eastern borders became one of the priorities of the EU in its 
relationship with the candidate countries, including provisions for financial assistance and 
expertise.   
 
Most recently the acknowledgment of the historical significance of enlargement has come 
simultaneously with the declared desire of political leaders across the European Union for the 
need to protect their labor markets from the wave of immigrants from the East, which the 
freedom of movement would potentially unleash.  The argument is that low cost workers from 
the new members will migrate west and take away jobs from the local labor force, and drive 
down wages. As a result, all of the current member states except Ireland have imposed 
restrictions on the free movement of labor that could extend for up to seven years.  The 
perception of threat is evident in the words of Prime Minister Tony Blair, explaining why Britain 
would impose restrictions: “It is important that we recognize that there is a potential risk from 
these accession countries,” Mr. Blair told parliament, ”We will take whatever measures are 
necessary to make sure that the ‘pull factor’ which might draw people is closed off.”
27  In this 
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case the “danger” to the welfare system of the United Kingdom that workers from the new 
member states could represent is securitized with the assertion that any necessary measures 
would be taken to prevent it from occurring.  The result of similar discourses throughout the EU, 
including those members who initially favored opening their labor markets to the citizens of the 
new members, such as Spain, Sweden, and the UK, has been the adoption of policies establishing 
transition periods that could last up to seven years, even though the free movement of labor is a 
key principle of the integration process. 
 
In the case of the eastern enlargement it is potential large-scale labor movements and the 
permeability of the new border, and hence importation of criminality and possibly terrorism, that 
are seen as threatening, thereby pointing to the predominance of economic and security concerns 
in the various discourses.  Since security is constructed through language, the way that an issue is 
framed determines the structure of the discourse, which potentially can affect reality.  The 
transition periods for the free movement of labor have been adopted by the member states 
regardless of the number of studies, which show that immigration from the East will be 
considerably less than the expected “flood” of immigrants.  The latest study sponsored by the 
European Commission suggests that only about 1% of the working populations of the ten new 
members, or about 220,000 per year, are willing to move west.  Moreover, those who would 
move are young, well educated or enrolled in institutions of higher education,  and single 
persons, which in fact raises the issue of “brain drain” from the sending countries rather than an 
overwhelming wave of unskilled immigrants.
28 
 
Enlargement, Security, and the Militarization of Borders 
 
The issue of securitizing migration through speech acts has been well developed over the past 
decade, with due consideration given to the impact of securitizing rhetoric of national political 
leaders, EU officials as well as media representations, which have all pointed to the dangers of 
migration to the societal security of Western Europe.  Discursive practices, however, may not be 
sufficient in explain how speech acts have been translated into sets of restrictive national 
immigration policies, the emergence of pan-European immigration regimes and seemingly ever-
expanding enforcement of border controls at the edges of Europe.  Didier Bigo, for example, 
contends, that securitization cannot be separated from non-discursive practices, as “it is of the 
same nature as non-discursive practices, technologies at work, effects of power, struggles and 
especially institutional competition in the security field.”  Securitizing rhetoric necessitates a 
process of extensive mobilization of resources in order to become the dominant discourse.   
Hence, the completion of the securitization process depends on the ability of certain actors in 
society, namely, security professionals to create “power/knowledge” which overlays immigration 
with organized crime, unemployment, and even terrorism.  Everyday fears are then linked to the 
dangers of influx of migrants, requiring security professionals to use their knowledge in order to 
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assure and protect the public, as well as anticipate new dangers.
29 “Security agencies do not 
simply respond to threats; they take part in creating them by objectifying them in their routine 
work, in the way they put their statistics together, in the hierarchy given to different dangers, in 
the priorities they set, in the technical solutions available, in the know-how they think they 
possess.”
30  The securitized issues also have to be taken up by political actors.  In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, for example, the issues of immigration and xenophobia moved out of the 
periphery and into mainstream domestic politics in a number of EU member states, including 
Austria, France, Denmark, and Holland.  Investigating the way discursive practices influence the 
process of securitization, however, is not the purpose of this section.  Instead, it will look at some 
of the effects the expected wave of immigration with the accompanying trends of importing 
organized crime, drug-trafficking, and even terrorism into the EU have affected the new eastern 
border of the Union.   
 
It has been argued that the perceived security deficit that came with the abolition of the 
internal borders has been the primary rationale behind furthering integration in the area of police 
cooperation and external border controls.  The concept of internal security has progressively 
expanded both geographically – by extending police activities beyond national boundaries and 
becoming more interconnected, and structurally, through extending the scope of policing beyond 
the realm of crime control.  Steps have been taken toward harmonizing criminal justice systems 
and institutionalizing cross-border law enforcement cooperation, and increasing the budget and 
staff of Europol.  Other scholars, however, argue that the most important reasons for the 
Europeanization of police activities have to do with the struggle between and within various law 
enforcement agencies for larger budgets and legitimacy, as well as the move toward the costlier 
alternative of technological surveillance at a distance.
31 These measures were further 
strengthened in the wake of the terrorist attacks September 11, including the EU-wide arrest 
warrant.  As Peter Andreas argues, the hardening of the external borders of the EU to ensure the 
free mobility of its citizens has occurred along commonly agreed rules and procedures.  “Indeed, 
border control and the policing of CTAs (clandestine transnational actors) are areas of activity in 
which the EU is arguably starting to resemble and behave like a traditional, territorial state.  All 
new members must adopt the Schengen system as a condition of entry.”
32   
 
The extension of the emerging European border regime to the candidates as a major 
component of the accession process enabled the EU essentially to thicken its borders by utilizing 
its neighbors as buffers.  In addition to this transference of policy, another important trend is the 
militarization of borders, manifested in the increasing usage of military technology and 
interventions of armed forces in the efforts to curtail the flow of illegal immigrants.  Poland, for 
                                                           
29 Didier Bigo, “Securite et Immigration,” Cultures et Conflits (1998): 27in Claudia Aradau, “Migration: The Spiral 
of (In)Security,”  Rubikon.  March 2001. http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl      
 
30 Didier Bigo, “Border Regimes, Police Cooperation and Security,” in Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping 
the Boundaries of the European Union.  ed. Jan Zielonka, (Routledge: London and New York, 2002) 228. 
  
31 Bigo, “Border Regimes, Police Cooperation and Security,” 215. 
 
32 Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Lines: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security.  
28.2 (2003): 101. 
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example, which has long border with Ukraine, is well on its way to militarizing its borders, as the 
resort to military equipment becomes indispensable when all else fails in ensuring the security of 
the eastern borders.  Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic are all following suit.  While the 
militarization of the eastern border is heralded as a success in fulfilling the membership 
obligations of the European Union, there is also the apprehension among the new members about 
the disruptive impact of this process on their relations with neighboring countries.  Specifically, 
this emphasis on restrictive border policies undermines the headline goal of European foreign 
policy, namely, continent-wide stability, ending regional conflicts, and furthering economic 
integration.  It also testifies to the pre-eminence of the internal security of the EU over the 
foreign policies of the new members, and de facto gives law enforcement agencies powers that 
traditionally have been part of the external relations of the Union.  They also concern issues of 
freedom and democracy as they undermine the principle of non-intervention of the military in 
domestic civilian life.”
33  
 
These developments also suggest another fundamental difference between the old and 
new member states of the EU: the former are much more internal-security minded, whereas 
regional stability is still a priority for most of the new member states. The integration process 
eliminated the possibility of large-scale violence in Western Europe and the relative peace and 
stability in its immediate neighborhood to the east have allowed the current members to focus on 
aspects of security other than the traditional military ones.  The CEECs, on the other hand, 
because of their long-standing economic, social, cultural, and political linkages with their 
neighbors further east, emphasize the importance of bilateral relations.  Those countries that are 
left out or have no prospect of joining the EU any time soon, are even more susceptible to the 
effects of instability in the region.  This divergence in the objects of security is a contributing 
factor in the creation of the two “Europes” that currently seem to exist.  
 
The concept of free movement of persons within the EU, and the even tighter border 
around this area, especially with its militarization, are linked to the inclusive/exclusive character 
of the emerging European immigration policy.
34  In line with Malcolm Anderson’s argument that 
borders are identity makers,
35 one side effect of the emerging EU immigration regime, 
epitomized by the Schengen area, is that it creates an in-group and out-group of Europeans.  The 
in-group is composed of EU citizens, whereas the out-group comprises those Europeans whose 
“Europeanness” is questioned, at least in the prevalent discourse.  This delineation constitutes the 
basis for defining “us” and “them,” the former being the citizens of wealthy, liberal democracies 
of Western Europe, and the latter being the much poorer and not yet assimilated the liberal 
values of the European “community of values” inhabitants of those countries that have been left 
out.  For the new member states, becoming one of the in-group involves adopting exclusionary 
rules toward their neighbors to the east; in other words,”admission to the club of well-to-do 
                                                           
33 Bigo 235. 
 
34 Agnieszka Weinar, Securitization and Humanitarianism – Polish Migration Policy and the Communities of 
Meaning.   Paper presented at the CGES Conference, February 20-21, 2004, Washington, DC. 
 
35 Malcolm Anderson, “European Frontiers at the End of the Twentieth Century,”  The Frontiers of Europe.  
Anderson, Malcolm and Eberhard Bort, ed.  (Pinter Publishers: London and Washington, 1998) 4. 
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members depends on taking over the rules of exclusion of non-members.”
36 For the ten countries 
that will accede in May 2004 this also means that their perceptions of the “other” have also had 
to change as part of their adaptation to the EU; in other words, the process of joining the EU has 
triggered a gradual process of creating the “other” as the foreigner from the East and the South  
 
 
Security, Border Policies, and Expansion of the European Union  
  
It has been argued that a number of the internal security threats, especially terrorism, are 
territorially unbound, in other words, neither their origins nor their targets are confined to any 
particular state or territorial unit.  Yet, ironically, both the United States and the European Union 
have responded to the terrorist threat by fortifying their borders with the rest of the world, 
especially with that part of it that happens to be poorer, politically more volatile, and culturally 
different.  This further exacerbates the effects of exclusion of those less fortunate and different 
from the security of the gated communities that the European Union and the United States have 
become.  The issue of the free movement of labor for the new members, in conjunction with the 
new enlargement, and the ongoing debate on what Europe is and where it ends, all compound the 
problem of identity with some very real implications. 
 
Hence, while both the single market and the Schengen agreement are intended to ensure 
the free movement of people, for those in Eastern Europe and they are perceived as elements of a 
discriminatory regime.  As Jan Zielonka points out, “Schengen has become a symbol of 
exclusion of the poor and allegedly less civilized European nations by wealthy and arrogant 
superior ones.”
37 In this sense, borders are also a matter of discourse, dependent upon the context 
in which they are used.  Future rounds of enlargement, including the expected accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the discussions of the eventual membership of Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Moldova, among others, give rise to new fears because of the possibility of 
importing minority problems into Europe.  As Bigo questions, “Freedom of movement will have 
had its day.  It will apply to some sections of the Union’s membership but not to others.  How 
should we react to this argument that destroys the European idea?  Can we accept a division of 
an enlarged EU into two zones, one with freedom of movement and one without?”
38 While 
freedom of movement is perhaps the most tangible benefit for the citizens of the new member 
states of the EU and a key symbol of the “return to Europe,” its gradual extension is an example 
of short-term economic interests and domestic political concerns taking precedence of the notion 
of European citizenship.  
 
                                                           
36 Dietrich Thranhardt, “Europe – A New Immigration Continent.  Policies and Politics in Comparative 
Perspective.”  (Transaction Publishers: Somerset, NJ, 1994) 67. 
 
37 Jan Zielonka, “Introduction,” Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union.  
ed. Jan Zielonka, (Routledge: London and New York, 2002) 1-2. 
 
38 Bigo 234. 
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The practical effects of this new dividing line include alienating the EU’s current or 
future neighbors, and possibly their protracted instability, disrupting economic and social ties on 
both sides of the border, infringing on free trade, jeopardize the existing system of civic rights 
and freedoms, and the cost of border-monitoring.  First and foremost, however, it has been 
argued that there is little evidence to suggest that the attempts to control organized crime, 
terrorism, and immigration along EU’s external borders have been effective.  On the contrary, “a 
hard border creates extra demand for organized cross-border crime.”
39  Eberhard Bort concurs 
that,” human trafficking is a consequence of frontier restrictions, rather than of open borders.  
The higher the obstacles for border crossings, the greater the need for the ‘illegal’ to seek the aid 
of ‘experts,’ and the higher the price, and the risk for the illegal immigrant.”
40  
 
  It is also necessary to disassociate the concepts of migration and criminality, since only a 
fraction of the border crossings into the EU are illegal in nature.  In addition to border policing, 
tackling the problems of illegal immigration and organized crime may require a more focused 
attention on their sources within the societies of Eastern European states, and particularly their 
unstable institutions and economies.  The prosperity gap between Eastern and Western Europe 
further compounds the necessity to provide financial as well as organizational support for these 
countries, as well as an incentive for the successful completion of their political and economic 
transformations.  The perspective of EU and NATO memberships, for examples, provided 
perhaps the most important incentive for the soon-to-become members from Central Europe to 
stay the course of transition, and it continuous to do so for Turkey’s continued democratization.  
While restrictive border policies may appear to protect against the perceived threats, in the long 
run they may prove counterproductive for the development of cross-border cooperation, and the 
stability of Europe as a whole.
41  
  
Conclusion 
 
This article has attempted to show linkages made between the eastern enlargement of the 
European Union and security concerns.  In particular, non-military security issues such as 
immigration, organized crime, and terrorism have been grouped together to form single security 
continuum, which has been securitized with respect to the cross-border activities from and 
through Central and Eastern Europe.  Migration was transformed from a managerial issue into a 
security one, with policy implications for the external borders of the enlarged EU.  This 
transformation was facilitated by the particular historical context as well as by domestic political 
concerns.  The securitization of immigration also blurs the boundaries between legitimate 
governance and political exploitation of the issue.   
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The redefinition of Europe in institutional terms -- namely, the prospects for EU and 
NATO enlargements -- contributed to stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe which were 
undergoing difficult political and economic transformations, some amid a process of nation-
building as well.  While these developments provided the basis for transmitting liberal values to 
the CEECs and thereby ensuring the consolidation of their democracies, the peace, stability, and 
prosperity that Europe’s enlargements sought to ensure may well be undermined with the 
shifting of the external borders of the enlarged EU further east.  In other words, the main goal of 
European foreign policy – peace and stability – of which enlargement is a critical part, may well 
be endangered by policies dictated by the strict enforcement of external borders.  In a global 
security environment characterized by insecurity and risks, there is a necessity for a 
comprehensive approach to security problems, including addressing their root causes.  An 
enlarged and stronger EU of pan-European proportions can play this role, extend the zone of 
stability to the neighboring regions, and contribute to the strengthening of international order.  
The realization of this potential security role, however, rests with the political will of its member 
states.     
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